President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India will begin from December 4, 2025, and this visit has the potential to infuse new energy into Delhi-Moscow defense relations. There is a possibility that during this visit, Russia may formally propose its fifth generation fighter aircraft SU-57 to India. So a proposal that would be difficult to ignore amid the Indian Air Force’s declining squadron numbers, the two-front threat and the long delay in AMCA.
Question: Will India see this proposal as an opportunity to increase immediate combat capability, or will it conflict with its long-term indigenous plans?
India’s air power today is at a critical juncture, where both immediate operational needs and long-term strategic self-reliance are standing face to face. Older fighters are retiring rapidly, Tejas deliveries are slow, and the AMCA prototype looks unlikely to arrive before the next decade. In such a situation, the proposal of SU-57 is not just a deal, but a test. Will India repeat the same historic delay again, or this time choose decisive action in time?
The Indian Air Force is undoubtedly very powerful, it has weapons with new technology, due to which enemy countries are afraid of confronting it. But the real difficulty lies in tomorrow. Our old planes slowly disappear are happening and new planes not on time Are able to come. our indigenous aircraft ‘4.5 Gen. ‘Tejas of’ It is also being made late. The biggest concern is that while China has gone far ahead of us and is building sixth generation aircraft, our next big 5 Gen. Aircraft ‘AMCA’is in the initial stages of construction since 2010 and will take another 15-20 years to arrive.
In fact, India has set a long term goal – Fifth generation indigenous people like AMCA Program – decided, but Short-term Operational Readiness The question was not given the required seriousness. Delivery of Tejas is taking time, the time for AMCA prototype has stretched till the next decade. times like these ‘Stop-Gap’ no, rather ‘Strategic-Capability Bridging’ Is required.
Question: Has self-reliance been made the only option to fill the immediate operational void, when it could have also been pursued as a parallel strategic path?
The real strength of any army is determined not only by its present weapons, but by its decisions of the past several years and the preparations made for the future. This is where our trouble begins. Many of our fighter planes are very old. MIG-21 has already been retired and aircraft like Jaguar are also on the verge of retirement. No concrete decisions were taken to buy or build new aircraft in the last three decades. For this reason the Air Force planes The number of squadrons has reduced to just 31whereas the need is much greater than this. At the root of all this have been problems like reluctance and delay in taking major decisions, losing opportunities, and not being able to complete the work on time.
It is clear that the options for India are now very limited. our whole offensive strength Bus two planes, SU-30 is based on MKI and only 36 Rafale. in recent years The last fighter induction was of 36 Rafale or Tejas.After this no decisive advance has been seen, That is, there has been no major increase in our strength, while old aircraft are continuously being retired,
Meanwhile, Operation ‘Sindoor’ has already taken place and its next edition depends on Pakistan’s stance. The enemy has had a long time to prepare. Now that the situation may become tense again, having airplanes alone is not enough. What is really needed is complete preparation – i.e. adequate number of modern aircraft, good weapons.
Rafale Case: In the year 2000, the Air Force clearly indicated that Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was needed to replace the Soviet-era MiG-21. This was the moment when India could lay the foundation of its next generation air power. But the decision remained pending for seven years and In August 2007, RFP was issued for 126 aircraft.
After the change of central government in 2014, Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed between India and France on 23 September 2016, under which 36 Rafale fighter planes were purchasedWhereas according to the original MMRCA plan, 126 aircraft were to be taken, There were supposed to be seven squadrons, but in reality only two squadrons were inducted.France recorded record performance in on-time delivery — the first five Rafales arrived in Ambala on 27 July 2020, formally inducted into the Indian Air Force on 10 September 2020, and the last Rafale was delivered on 15 December 2022, As soon as the IAF tweeted – “The Pack is Complete”,
Question: The question still remains that when Rafale was being delivered on record time, why were more orders for Rafale not placed in time?
At that time—or in the years that followed— If 2 or 3 additional squadrons were orderedSo today the Indian Air Force does not have to worry so much about the decreasing squadron numbers. From December 2022 to December 2025 – three years – that is, at least 2-3 more Rafale squadrons could have been ordered at the same time, so that the combat capability of the Air Force becomes one ‘Waiting Mode’ I don’t want to go.
Air Defence: India has rightly emphasized its air defense capabilities (e.g. S-400, MR-SAM), and their effectiveness has been demonstrated in wars such as Operation Sindoor. However, this success is limited to a particular scenario—where the enemy is relatively weak or the attack has been limited. Air defense systems are essentially defensive and reactive; That means they depend on the initiative of the enemy. These systems can compensate for some of the shortcomings of fighter jets. Can’t make fighter jets.
During Operation Sindoor, India used its indigenous air defense and supersonic BrahMos very well. But the real test comes when the enemy is equal to or more powerful than you. A situation of war can arise on your two fronts at any time. In such a situation, mere protection is not enough. Combat capability and deterrence power come from offensive air power. Sufficient number of modern fighter jets (like Rafale, Su-30MKI, and in future AMCA) Only by going into the enemy’s territory can we destroy his plans, put him on the defensive, and maintain pressure on both fronts simultaneously.
Air defense is the ‘shield’ of security, but fighter jets are the ‘sword’ of victory. Only the balance of both can fully prepare India for the complex challenges of the future. Modern air defense system is necessary, but not a permanent solution to the shortage of fighter aircraft.
President Putin and SU-57: SU-57 deal is very important. India is facing the crisis of reduction in Air Force squadrons and strategic pressure on two fronts. In such a situation, the SU-57 deal proposed by Russia will give an instant benefit. The aircraft is officially fifth generation and comes with the promise of full technology transfer from Sukhoi. India already has Su-30MKI has extensive experience, technical knowledge and maintenance infrastructure working on Sukhoi platformswhich would theoretically make it easier to adopt. Given the long delivery time for indigenous programs like AMCA, this deal is a quick and concrete solution. Which can drastically increase the offensive capability of the Air Force in just 5-10 years.
However, a large-scale purchase (approximately 10 squadrons) could seriously impair the financial and strategic priority for India’s ambitious indigenous AMCA programme, thereby defeating the goal of long-term technological self-reliance. Under these circumstances, the most prudent course may be to adopt a balanced and cautious strategy.
India may consider a small-scale initial deal with Russia, such as a limited purchase of 4-5 squadrons and joint production. This will give the Air Force time to evaluate the real capabilities of the platform, test Russia’s promises, and train its own technicians, without completely shifting budget and priority to long-term indigenous programs like AMCA. Also, this deal can be used as a support for AMCA to transfer critical technology such as engines or sensorsIn this way, India can secure its future technological independence while bridging some of its immediate capability gaps,
This decision will be judged by future historians. “Why didn’t you do it when you should have done it?” This is the same bitter question that has been asked about the defense policy of the last three decades. Today, we are faced with a new version of the same question. Will we be able to learn from those mistakes? In the age of drones, cyber warfare and anti-access area denial (A2/AD) systems, the role of air power is more decisive than ever. Therefore, the decision on SU-57 should not be just ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This should be a decision to make it clear that
Can we move beyond a ‘buying mindset’ and adopt a ‘strategic capability building’ mindset?
Can we make this deal provide a technological ladder for AMCA, a training ground for our engineers and immediate offensive power for the Air Force?
If yes, then this is a step forward. If not, we risk repeating history.
